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C ertain recent events causedme to doubt whether I knowmy own mind or not. Let meexplain. 
Last week, the first of our
academic year, all first-year students in
our degree program underwent a
supervised test in which they pull an
old computer to pieces and put it back
together again. We give this test to put
a healthy disrespect for digital cir-
cuitry—which is, at heart, only care-
fully polluted sand—into each stu-
dent’s mind as early as possible. We
intend this disrespect to counter the
superstition, held both by naïve stu-
dents and by members of the public
susceptible to media persuasion, that
digital machinery has much in com-
mon with the human brain.
Yesterday, I went to a lunchtime phi-
losophy club lecture titled “Why the
Body Is the Mind.” Because some of
the discussion related to consciousness,
I recalled Giorgio Buttazzo’s article,
“Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or
Real Possibility?” (Computer, July
2001, pp. 24-30). The juxtaposition
suggested a strange contrast between
computing people, who see mental
capabilities in machines because they
do not appreciate how complex the
human brain is, and philosophers, who
see complexities in the human mind
because they do not appreciate that the
brain and the computer share some
simple and fundamental properties.
However, not being a philosopher, I
find it difficult to be confident that I
understand them when they discuss the
mind. This uncertainty leaves at least
three possibilities:
• either I understand the basic
nature of my mind and the
philosophers don’t,
• vice versa, or
• we share the same understanding
but express it in mutually incom-
prehensible language.
Later, I read Bob Colwell’s provoca-
tive essay “Engineering, Science, and
Quantum Mechanics” (Computer,
Feb. 2002, pp. 8-10). Toward his
essay’s end, Colwell reported of entan-
glement theory that “the [photon’s]
wave function’s actual point of col-
lapse is when a conscious mind per-
ceives the results” and that the collapse
was caused by “the synapses of our
brains, acting in concert to form our
minds, at the instant we detected the
photon.”
Suddenly, I felt alone, isolated, out
of my depth, and fearfully vulnerable.
What follows is meant to enlist your
sympathy and rebuild my confidence.
THE MIND AS PROCESS
According to my Macquarie Diction-
ary (Macquarie Library Pty. Ltd.,
Sydney, 1981; http://www.macquarie
dictionary.com.au), the principal mean-
ing of mind is “that which thinks, feels,
and wills, exercises perception, judg-
ment, reflection, etc., as in a human or
other conscious being: the processes of
the mind.” The principal definition of
process is “a systematic series of actions
directed to some end.”
An action requires an actor, presum-
ably the mind in this case. Why not the
brain? The Macquarie defines the brain
as “the … nerve substance that fills the
cranium of man and other vertebrates;
centre of sensation, body coordination,
thought, emotion, etc.” Why so coy?
Where is the mind in this brain?
The computer works like the mind-
as-actor in that it functions as a device
that processes data—conventional rep-
resentations of facts or ideas. The cir-
cuits carry out the computer’s
processing by copying, transmitting,
and transforming these data.
The mind, given the Macquarie def-
inition, processes thoughts, feelings,
intentions, perceptions, judgments,
reflections, and so on. Neurons and
glial cells process neural and hormonal
representations of sensations past and
present.
Although the idea of the mind as dis-
tinct from the brain has a natural
appeal, defining the mind as an actor
distinct from the brain invokes an
unnecessary, even deceptive, dualism.
Our mind thinks, feels, perceives, and
so on, whereas our brain merely exists
between our ears. The distinction can
be useful and productive.
The problem lies in defining the
mind as an actor rather than an action.
If we regard the mind as the thinking
process, it becomes distinct from the
brain and becomes the systematic
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Although the human brain 
and the digital computer 
share many traits, simulating
the mind in silicon may be
impossible.
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Let’s apply some numbers to this
speculation. The fly and I have much
the same kind of neural signaling sys-
tem. The average local fly measures
about 10 mm, and I am roughly 200
times that length. My reaction time is
about one-tenth of a second. A sub-
millisecond reaction time for a fly is
thus not at all mysterious, nor would
much shorter reaction times in a digi-
tal computer be in any way puzzling.
Where then is consciousness in all this?
Whence consciousness?
Is a fly conscious? Well, it’s aware to
the extent it can often dodge a swat—
its perceptual neural system alerts it to
the swatting hand so that it can dart
out of harm’s way. But what part of the
fly’s nervous processing is aware, and
thus to some degree conscious?
Awareness must emerge at least
from the transformation of perception
into the intent or neglect of an action.
The transformation of sensation into
perception can be unconscious because
it can be automatic: We remain, for
example, cheerfully oblivious to the
dramatic data compression our retinas
carry out. The transformation of inten-
tion into motion can similarly be
unconscious: We do not consciously
stimulate each individual muscle in our
mouth, throat, and chest as we speak.
For the fly, we might imagine that its
nervous system functions like a com-
puter system: Its central processor
“consciously” forms intentions on the
basis of perceptions that its peripheral
sensory system “unconsciously” pro-
duces, then its peripheral motor system
“unconsciously” puts those intentions
into effect.
Cache as cache can
We can transfer this analogy to the
human nervous system to explain how
series of actions the brain takes as it
processes sensations and reconstructs
memories.
We can thus view the brain as sub-
stance, the mind as process. Likewise,
we can view the computer as substance
and its computations as process. The
brain exists materially, while the mind
arises as a property of changes within
the brain. Similarly, the computer
exists materially, while computation
occurs as a property of changes within
the computer. So far, so simple.
SOURCE OF CONFUSION
Consciousness seems to be the con-
fusing factor. We associate self-aware-
ness and identity with consciousness.
Buttazzo writes, “Because we cannot
enter another being’s mind, we cannot
be sure about its consciousness.” This
theme recurs in writings on the philos-
ophy of the mind. But if a mind is a
process, it’s meaningless to talk about
anything entering it. 
Processes can only be perceived, thus
inferring the operation of another
mind from such perception must surely
be sufficient. If anyone argues that we
need certainty, we can counter that no
one can be certain of anything, as the
“brain in a vat” argument shows
(http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/
MindDict/cartesianskepticism.html).
Cycle time versus data rate
In speculating about the effect of
cycle time on artificial consciousness,
Buttazzo poses a curious question, “If
consciousness emerges in an artificial
machine, what will time perception be
like to a simulated brain that thinks
millions of times faster than a human
brain?” What does “be like” mean
here? In any case, the question con-
fuses cycle time with data rate—the
stupendous parallelism of the brain
makes the cycle time of our present
digital computers irrelevant.
However, Buttazzo speculates that the
world might seem to slow down for a
simulated brain as perhaps it does for a
fly, “thus giving the fly plenty of time to
glide out of the way” of a swatting hand.
consciousness arises from it, except that
we have a more complex central proces-
sor than does a fly and much more
occupies our minds than mere percep-
tions and intentions. We have extensive
memory traces from which neural
processes can reconstruct pseudoper-
ceptions that pass through our con-
sciousness. Intentions cannot be based
practically on reconstructing all our
possible memories at once. Part of our
brain processes perceptions together
with relevant pseudoperceptions to
derive intentions. The processing of this
area within the forebrain must be
closely allied to our consciousness.
Human consciousness therefore
strongly resembles the processing that
a digital computer’s central processor
and its associated main store cache
carry out. The cache brings relevant
data close to where the current com-
putation can use them. In this sense,
then, our present-day computers are
conscious, if their CPU has a cache.
VIVE LA DIFFÉRENCE
Observing that “The human brain
has about 1012 neurons, and … 1015
synapses,” Buttazzo calculates that,
using artificial neural networks,
“Simulating the human brain requires 5
million Gigabytes” of data storage.
Moore’s law suggests that digital com-
puters will have main stores of that
capacity by 2029, although Buttazzo
carefully qualifies this observation by
adding that it “refers only to a necessary
but not sufficient condition for the devel-
opment of an artificial consciousness.”
Using a digital computer to simulate
an artificial neural network that simu-
lates the human brain does not seem
the best approach. Given the neural
parallelism to be modeled, using ana-
log circuits to directly implement
neural networks would seem a better
alternative, one that might bring the
feasibility date well forward, if
research could divert the circuit man-
ufacturing industry to this cause. But
this begs the question of whether arti-
ficial neural networks can be made
comparable with real ones.
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The brain exists 
materially, while the mind
arises as a property of
changes within the brain.
In an artificial neural network, each
node, or neuron, has an activation
value that the network passes forward
to other nodes through connections, or
synapses. The synapse to each forward
node has an associated weight that
modulates the incoming activation
value’s effect on the forward node’s
activation. The weights can be adjusted
in various ways likened to “learning.”
An artificial neural network’s nodes
mimic the classical neuron—but very
roughly—with an axon down which
the repetition rate of an action poten-
tial, the spike, passes an analog value,
dependent on the activation of the neu-
ron’s main body.
Disregarding as a mere production
problem attaining 1012 neurons and
1015 synapses in analog circuitry, where
do artificial neural networks fall short
of the real thing?
• The activation of a classical neu-
ron is not an arithmetic sum of the
synaptic effects. Rather, a complex
process involving the intervals
between action potentials at indi-
vidual synapses and their relative
timings between synapses deter-
mines the activation.  The more
neurons are studied the more such
complexity is revealed.
• The human nervous system con-
tains many different kinds of neu-
rons and many kinds of glial cells.
The glial cells provide more than
support because they signal and
have synapses just as neurons do.
• Action potentials alone do not
control nervous signaling. Graded
potentials and hormonal signaling
also play a part, as does the great
variety of different neurotrans-
mitters and hormones.
Creating an artificial consciousness
does not require simulating these com-
plexities. But human consciousness lies
far beyond any presently contemplated
artificial one. We have, for example,
developed a highly complex and utterly
human consciousness of our physical
bodies. Likewise, we have a highly
developed consciousness of other peo-
ple and of our society, whose collective
consciousness shapes our development
as humans.
O bvious parallels exist between thebrain and digital computers. Tofulfill their responsibility to them-
selves, and to others who might be mis-
led by journalistic hyperbole, computing
professionals should have well-founded
opinions about the extent of these par-
allels. The profession should refrain
from applying humanistic names to its
mechanistic endeavors, and it must be
conscious always of the essential differ-
ences between people and computers.
Perhaps in 50 or 100 years, our
machines will acquire a humanlike
consciousness and intelligence. But
such machines will be utterly different
from the puerile imitations we now
have or can realistically design. Getting
to such machines will raise profes-
sional and philosophical issues quite
different from those that reflect on the
nature of what human and machine
consciousness can generate.
And what about the mind and entan-
glement theory? If a CPU and its cache
possess consciousness, we could leave
looking at photons to them. In any
case, I’ve now put entanglement theory
into the back of my mind under the
shade of the tree in Bishop Berkeley’s
quad (http://homepages.which.net/
~radicalfaith/search/a3.htm). 
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In the coming months,Computing in Science &Engineering will publish a
series of articles on the
general topic of the bounds
on computing. We plan to
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